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Dual-Mode NIZKs:  
Possibility and Impossibility Results for  
Property Transfer

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
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
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# Non-interactive Proof Systems [BFM88]



language associated with  $R$  and  $\text{crs}$

$$L_R(\text{crs}) = \{x \mid \exists w \text{ s.t. } R(\text{crs}, x, w) = \text{true}\}$$



**SYNTAX**

$$\text{crs} \leftarrow \Pi.C(1^\lambda)$$

CRS generation

$$\pi \leftarrow \Pi.P(1^\lambda, \text{crs}, x, w)$$

Proof generation

$$d \leftarrow \Pi.V(1^\lambda, \text{crs}, x, \pi)$$

Verification

# Properties for Non-Interactive Proof Systems

## SOUNDNESS

An adversary (given the crs) should **not** be able to find  $x \notin L_R(\text{crs})$  and a proof  $\pi$  such that  $\Pi.V(1^\lambda, \text{crs}, x, \pi) = \text{true}$

There are different variants of soundness present. We will consider : **SND-E** and **SND-P**

**EXTRACTABILITY** [GMR89,BG93,DP92] has access to a trapdoor underlying the crs

If an adversary produces a valid proof for a statement, there is an extractor that can extract the witness from the information available to the adversary

## WITNESS-INDISTINGUISHABILITY

If one knows  $x \in L_R(\text{crs})$  and two witnesses  $w_0$  and  $w_1$  for  $x$ , then it is hard to tell which witness was used for proof generation

$$\rightarrow R(\text{crs}, x, w_0) = R(\text{crs}, x, w_1) = \text{true}$$

## ZERO-KNOWLEDGE



A proof generated for a statement  $x \in L_R(\text{crs})$  should reveal no information about the witness for the statement.

# Dual-mode Proof Systems

First built in [GOS06, GOS12].

Two proof systems

$\Pi_0$  |  $\Pi_1$




**Why?** [GOS06]

# Prior definitions and work

	mode 0 requirements	mode 1 requirements	
[AFHLP16]	perfect soundness and extractability	perfect ZK and WI	<i>for multi-linear maps</i>
[HU19]	statistical soundness and extractability	statistical WI	<i>construct dual-mode NIZKs</i>
[LPWW20]	statistical soundness	statistical ZK	<i>construct dual-mode NIZKs</i>
[GOS06]	perfect soundness	perfect ZK	<i>construct dual-mode NIZKs</i>
[BCCKLS09]	perfect soundness	perfect WI	<i>for anonymous credentials</i>

# Transference



We say that Property P **transfers** if this diagram is true

The purpose and applications of prior work depend on property transference

**P**

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SND-E

ZK

WI

XT

**Which properties P transfer?**

# Contributions

## Definitions

mode-indistinguishability

- ❖ dual-mode proof systems are defined with only a CRS indistinguishability requirement

## Formulating the transference question


### Negative results

for dual-mode proof systems

- ❖ SND-P soundness does not transfer
- ❖ separation between SND-E and SND-P

for regular proof systems

computational  
indistinguishability of CRS



### Positive results

- ❖ property specifications
  - ❖ transfer theorem
  - ❖ standard definitions of ZK, WI, extractability transfer
- } abstraction to capture all positive results simultaneously

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
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# Dual-mode Proof System Syntax

$$\text{crs} \leftarrow \text{D}\Pi . \text{C}(1^\lambda, \mu)$$

CRS generation

$$\pi \leftarrow \text{D}\Pi . \text{P}(1^\lambda, \text{crs}, x, w)$$

Proof generation

$$d \leftarrow \text{D}\Pi . \text{V}(1^\lambda, \text{crs}, x, \pi)$$

Verification

Two induced proof systems :  $\Pi_0$  and  $\Pi_1$

non-interactive proof systems

**MODE-INDISTINGUISHABILITY**


computational indistinguishability

$$\text{D}\Pi . \text{C}(1^\lambda, 0)$$

$$\rightarrow \text{crs}_0$$

$$\approx \text{crs}_1$$

$$\leftarrow \text{D}\Pi . \text{C}(1^\lambda, 1)$$



This is the only property we require of dual-mode proof systems

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
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
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# Transference of a property $P$



Examples of properties  $P$



A property  $P$  transfers if it can be specified in polynomial-time

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
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# Types of Soundness for relation $R$

regular proof systems

## Penalty and Exclusion [BHK15]

**Game  $G_{\Pi,R,\lambda}^{\text{snd-p}}$**

INIT():  
 1  $\text{crs} \leftarrow \$ \Pi.C(1^\lambda)$  ; Return crs

FIN( $x, \text{pf}$ ):  
 2 If  $(x \in L_R(\text{crs}))$  then return false  
 3 Return  $\Pi.V(1^\lambda, \text{crs}, x, \text{pf})$

**Game  $G_{\Pi,R,\lambda}^{\text{snd-e}}$**

INIT():  
 1  $\text{crs} \leftarrow \$ \Pi.C(1^\lambda)$  ; Return crs

FIN( $x, \text{pf}$ ):  
 2 If  $(x \in L_R(\text{crs}))$  then  $\text{bad} \leftarrow \text{true}$   
 3 Return  $\Pi.V(1^\lambda, \text{crs}, x, \text{pf})$

**Membership-conscious adversary**  
 picks  $x \in L_R$  with negligible probability  
 i.e. sets  $\text{bad} \leftarrow \text{true}$  with negligible probability

		win condition	restriction on PT adversary	good for applications?
<b>Penalty-style</b>	SND-P	$(x \notin L_R) \wedge (\Pi.V(\dots) \rightarrow \checkmark)$	none	yes
<b>Exclusion-style</b>	SND-E	$(\Pi.V(\dots) \rightarrow \checkmark)$	membership-conscious	no

We consider digital signatures [BG90] as a canonical application

# Relating SND-P and SND-E

regular proof systems

$\text{SND-P} \Rightarrow \text{SND-E}$

Any (membership-conscious) adversary that attacks the SND-E notion also attacks the SND-P notion

$\text{SND-E} \not\Rightarrow \text{SND-P}$

This shows SND-E is strictly weaker than SND-P

We show this via a counter-example (assuming the hardness of DDH)

We build a non-interactive proof system  $\Pi$  and relation  $R$  such that

(1)  $\Pi$  satisfies SND-E

(2)  $\Pi$  does not satisfy SND-P.

We show this via an explicit attack that succeeds with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$

# SND-P does not transfer!

dual-mode proof systems



## Intuition :

SND-P fails to transfer because transference would require a reduction adversary to perform a **test of membership** (which would be inefficient for languages  $\in \text{NP}$ )

Recall: SND-P win condition

$$(x \notin L_R) \wedge (\Pi \cdot V(\dots) \rightarrow \checkmark)$$

## Theorem :

Assume there exists a group generator for which DDH is hard. There exists a dual-mode proof system  $D\Pi$  and a relation  $R$  such that

$D\Pi$  is mode-indistinguishable

$D\Pi_1$  is SND-P for  $R$

$D\Pi_0$  is **not** SND-P for  $R$

## COUNTER-EXAMPLE

assumes DDH is hard in group  $G$

MODE-INDISTINGUISHABILITY

SND-P FOR  $D\Pi_1$

$$D\Pi.C(1^\lambda, \mu) \rightarrow \text{crs} = (G, g, g^a, g^b, g^c) \begin{cases} \mu = 0 \implies c = ab \\ \mu = 1 \implies c \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{Z}_{|G|} \end{cases}$$

Proof generation is trivial

Verification accepts all  $x \in G$

$$L_R(\text{crs}) = G \setminus \{g^{ab}\}$$

ATTACK AGAINST SND-P FOR  $D\Pi_0$

Breaking soundness requires picking  $x = g^{ab}$

Return  $x = g^c$  and the trivial proof

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## Formulating the transference question


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## Positive results

- ❖ **property specifications**
  - ❖ **transfer theorem**
  - ❖ **standard definitions of ZK, WI, extractability transfer**
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# SND-E does transfer!



We are given that one mode of the dual-mode proof system satisfies SND-E soundness

We also know that the dual-mode proof system satisfies mode indistinguishability

The main idea is that if the other mode of the proof system did **not** satisfy SND-E soundness, then this difference in behavior would be used to break mode-indistinguishability

This works because there is no code in the SND-E game that is not polynomial-time, and therefore it can be simulated by the polynomial-time mode-indistinguishability adversary

# Property Specifications and Transfer Theorem

We formalize properties via the abstraction of **property specifications**.

The property specification for  $P$  captures the game defined for the property  $P$

Our constructed property specifications perfectly match the game for the target property

## Transfer Theorem :

(informal)

Let  $D\Pi$  be a dual-mode proof system satisfying mode-indistinguishability.

If one mode of  $D\Pi$  satisfies a **polynomial-time** property specification  $PS$ , then the other mode satisfies the computational counterpart of  $PS$ .

zero-knowledge

witness-indistinguishability

} PS is polynomial-time

extractability (proof of knowledge)

SND-E

PS is not polynomial-time

Recall: SND-P win condition

$(x \notin L_R) \wedge (\Pi . \forall(\dots) \rightarrow \checkmark)$

SND-P

# Capturing other models

So far : we have only discussed the CRS model

DESIGNATED VERIFIER MODEL

[ES02, PsV06, DFN06]

DESIGNATED PROVER MODEL


[KW18, KNYY19]

PREPROCESSING MODEL

[DMP90]

	$k_p$	$k_v$
CRS Model	✗	✗
Designated Verifier Model	✗	✓
Designated Prover Model	✓	✗
Preprocessing Model	✓	✓

$x$  →  
 $w$  →



# Summary

We defined dual-mode proof systems with only the mode-indistinguishability requirement

We define what it means for a property to transfer

We ask which properties transfer

We prove that SND-P does not transfer via a counter-example

We prove via a general framework, that many properties like ZK, WI, XT, SND-E do transfer

We show that SND-P is a strictly stronger notion than SND-E

- ❖ We must be careful when using dual-mode systems in applications!
- ❖ We must check that we actually do get the properties we require from the induced proof systems, and not expect it to be implicit due to transference

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